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vent the problem of double accounting, but in so doing numerous elements of a
speculative character are introduced. In addition to determining the truck's
contribution to the plaintiff's business-a problem which is also involved in the
award of special damages-the rate at which these profits are to be capitalized
must be determined. This rate will not only depend upon the length of the
period of deprivation, but also upon the comparable rates in other types of
business enterprise. It may be argued that such a determination is aleady
achieved by the operation of the "black market"--and with much greater accuracy than by a jury. Even conceding this, the difficulty that has faced courts
in eliciting testimony as to the price set by the "black market" is enough to
cast serious doubt upon the practicality of this approach.
The confusion that exists not only in the court's treatment of the instant case
but also in many of the normal damage cases, is a result of the inadequacy of
the traditional legal concepts and their lack of adaptability to a complex economic structure-and particularly to a war-time economy. The Iowa court, recognizing the inadequacy of the OPA price, has allowed a speculative guess by
a witness to control the compensation awarded, in the attempt to do approximate justice. The result achieved in terms of the amount of compensation may
not be shocking but there remains a judicial duty to develop a workable formula to deal with such problems.
It is submitted that, if it can be shown that the truck was not replaceable at
the ceiling price, compensation would be adequately determined by awarding
the plaintiff its value capitalized on the basis of its use. If care is used in accounting for the various factors involved, a satisfactory result would be achieved.

Domestic Relations-Constitutionality of "Anti-Heart-Balm" Statute-Liability to Children for Inducing Parent To Avoid Duty of Support-[Federal].The Daily family, husband, wife and four minor children, were residents of
Pennsylvania. The defendant and her husband were neighbors of the Dailys.
The defendant induced Mr. Daily to leave his family and move with her to
Chicago. Two suits were filed in the federal district court in Chicago-the first
by Mrs. Daily, setting forth a declaration based on alienation of affections and
depend upon the length of time that the truck cannot be replaced, it will be assumed that two
years will elapse from the time of the accident until a new supply of trucks will be on the
market. During the two-year period during which the plaintiff will be deprived of the truck, its
contribution to his business would have been $1,200. At the end of that period the truck would
have had a market value, which can be estimated roughly on the basis of its original cost less
four years' depreciation, of approximately $8oo. Thus, for the two-year period the truck will
represent a total principal and income of $2,000. Assuming that other business investments
during that period would have produced a io per cent profit, we find that $1,666 invested at
that rate for two years would produce a total principal and income of $2,ooo. Thus, $1,666
is the approximate "use value" of the truck. The difference of $366 in this method of computation and that in note 34, supra, is due to the fact that in the prior method the deprivation of
use subsequent to the date of the judgment was not accounted for.
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criminal conversation, the second for the four minor children by their mother
as next friend, charging substantially that the defendant induced and prevented their father from contributing to their support. In the first action the
defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it violated the
provisions of the Illinois and Pennsylvania "anti-heart-balm" statutes which'
made it unlawful to institute such actions. The district court in denying the
motion held that the statute violated Art. 2, Section i9 of the Illinois Constitution which provides that "every person ought to find a certain remedy in the
laws for all injuries and wrongs which he may receive in his person, property,
or reputation .....
Daily v. Parker.2 The district court sustained a motion
to dismiss the children's suit on the ground that the complaint failed to state a
cause of action. On appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals, held, that a child
has a right of action against one who has taken away the support and maintenance of its father. Judgment reversed. Daily v. Parker3
The alienationof affections action. In 1935 Mrs. Roberta West Nicholson, the
sole woman member of the Indiana legislature, introduced the first "anti-heartbalm" statute in an effort to outlaw several causes of action which had fallen
into disrepute because of their frequent use for blackmail purposes. 4 The Indiana statutes provided that the actions of breach of promise to marry, alienation of affections, and criminal conversation were abolished. An additional provision made it criminal to file or threaten to file such actions. Other states quickly followed suit and enacted similar statutes. Illinois, the exception to this
pattern, provided solely for criminal penalties and failed to provide specifically
for the abolition of the actions. But the difference between the acts is one of
form rather than substance. Otherwise it would mean that such actions could be
successfully prosecuted, but the plaintiff would be subjected to penalties.
The constitutionality of the New York and Indiana statutes was quickly
tested. The New York Court of Appeals in Hanfgarnv. Mark6 upheld the validity of the New York statute against the assertion that it violated the due
process clause of the Federal Constitution. 7 The court said that such causes of
I Ill. Rev. Stat. (1945) C. 38, §§ 246.1-5; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 1944) tit. 48,
§§ 17o-77.
261 F. Supp. 70, (Ill., 1945).
3 52 F. 2d 174 (C.C.A. 7th, 1945).
4 Preceding the enactment of the Indiana statute considerable newspaper publicity was
given to such actions owing to the interest feature of the action and the sizable judgments
which often resulted. In Woodhouse v. Woodhouse, 99 Vt. 9T, i3o Atl. 758 (1925) a verdict of
$465,ooo was reduced to $125,ooo by the trial judge. For further discussion of these actions
and the legislative enactments concerning them, see Abolition of Certain Actions Designed To
Protect the Family Relation, 30 Ill. L. Rev. 764 (1936).
s Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Supp. 1943) §§ 2-508.-I7.
6 274 N.Y. 22, 8 N.E. 2d 47 (I937).

7 The Appellate Division had found the act unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. Hanfgam v. Mark, 248 App. Div. 325, 289 N.Y. Supp. x43 (1936), noted in 3 Univ. Chi.
L. Rev. 654 (i936); 21 Corn. L. Q. 677 (i936); 85 U. Pa. L. Rev. io (1936).
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action were simply incidents of the marital relationship which is within the
domain of the state legislature to regulate. In Pennington v. Stewart5 the Indiana Supreme Court held that the section of the Indiana statute which abolished the causes of action did not violate a provision of the Indiana constitution
similar to the Illinois provision invoked in the instant case.
This provision of the state constitution presents problems similar to those
raised by the due process clause. 9 The fact such a provision has been utilized
to recognize a new cause of actionlo does not mean that it can be invoked to
give a vested right in a rule of law. The Fourteenth Amendment gives no property or vested right in any substantive rule of the common law.-I "Anti-heartbalm" statutes by abolishing causes of action substantially alter prior existing
rights and duties. But statutes which abolish certain defenses or create new
causes of action also substantially alter prior existing rights and duties. Such
statutes have been held not to violate the due process clause.1 "Anti-heartbalm" statutes have an additional feature of affecting only incidents of the
marital relationship, a field dearly within the domain of the state legislature.'3
The Penningtoncase, however, held the criminal section of the Indiana statute unconstitutional on the ground that the legislature could not by imposing
criminal penalties deny litigants the right to test the constitutionality of the
act. The court in the instant case relies upon this part of the Penningtoncase.
The court is justified in deriving support from the Pennington case if that
decision wiped the criminal provision of the statute from the Indiana statute
books. But if the Pennington case merely held the criminal section unconstitutional in its application to the litigants who were testing the constitutionality
of the act, leaving it valid as to future litigants who might file such actions, it
can be argued that the decision could only support the contention that the plain$ 212 Ind. 553, io N.E. 2d 619 (ig37), noted in 32 Ill.
L. Rev. 738 (1938).
9It is interesting to note that the plaintiff, being a woman, did not have such an action at
common law. Lynch v. Knight, 9 H.L. Cas. 577, 598 (z86i); see Brown, the Action for
Alienation of Affections, 82 U. Pa. L. Rev. 472, 476-78 (i934). It was not until igoo that the
Illinois supreme court recognized that a woman could maintain such a cause of action.
Betser v. Betser, 186 Ill.
537, 58 N.E. 249 (19oo).
"0Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. i9o, 5o S.E. 68 (19o5).
1"See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
1" Wrongful death statute, Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co. Inc. v. Yeldell, 274 U.S. 112 (1927);
Federal Employers Liability Act, New York Central R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917); and
guest passenger statute, Silver v. Silver, 28o U.S. 117 (1929). It has been attempted to differentiate these statutes from "anti-heart-balm" statutes on the ground that none of them completely abolishes common law remedies. Meyers, Validity of Statutes Prohibiting Breach of
Promise and Alienation of Affections Suits, 2 Ohio Opinions 146 (1935); Legislative Abolition
of Certain Actions Designed To Protect the Family Relation, 3o Ill.
L. Rev. 764, 775-79
(1936). In dictum a federal district court in Pennsylvania seriously questioned the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania "anti-heart-balm" statute in that it abolished a common-law right.
Wilder v. Reno, 43 F. Supp. 727 (Pa., 1942). But the difference lies in degree rather than kind.
The charges involved by all the statutes were substantial.
13Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. io (i888).
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tiff in the principal case should not be subject to penalties but could not proceed
to judgment.
However, at the same time that the instant case was pending in the federal
court, a breach of promise action and an alienation of affections suit were adjudicated in the Superior Court of Cook County in both of which the Illinois
act was held unconstitutional. The federal court, bound as it is by Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins,4 was under a duty to follow these lower court decisions because
they are the sole source of Illinois law on the subject.' 5 Should the Supreme
Court of Illinois in reviewing these actions hold the Illinois act constitutional,
it would only leave the instant case as one more strange anomaly under the
Erie doctrine.
The children's right of action. The common law has long recognized that a
parent is responsible for the support of his minor children.' Since the Elizabethan era criminal penalties have been imposed on parents who have attempted to avoid this duty,'7 and today a parent is liable to a third person who
furnishes necessities to his children.' 8 The failure to furnish support is thus
attended by consequences which can only be explained by the existence of a
duty on the part of a parent to support his offspring. The only person unable to
enforce this duty has been the child himself. 9 This failure to provide a cause of
action for the child unquestionably had its antecedents in the generally inferior
position of the minor under Roman law and the early common law. As society
became more conscious of the need to provide protection for minors, the inability of the child to sue a delinquent parent was even more anomalous. This
anachronism became more apparent as the rationalizations offered for denying
2°
the action became more obviously unsatisfactory.
The refusal to permit a child to sue has been based either on the dubious
premise that a parent owes a moral-not a legal-duty of support or on the
equally questionable assumption that to permit such suits would destroy the
harmony of the family and upset the repose of society. In tort actions between
parent and child there is ground to deny such actions where there is real danger
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
is See West v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223 (1940); Six Companies v. Joint
Highway District, 311 U.S. i8o (ig4o); Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 464
(194o); Developments in the Doctrine of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. II, 9 Univ. Chi.
L. Rev. 308, 319-23 (1942).
z6 1 B1. Comm. *447; 2 Kent, Commentary *8g.
'4

'7 Stat. 43

Eliz., C.2 (17o6); Stat. 5 Geo. I, c. 8 (1718); IIl. Rev. Stat. (1945) c. 38, § oo-ioi.

i 8 Knutsen v. Haugen, 191 Minn. 420, 254 N.W. 464 (1934). Rest., Restitution § 113 (1937).

"9Rawling v. Rawlings, 121 Miss. 140. 83 So. 146 (1919); Huke v. Huke, 44 Mo. App. 3o8
(i8gi). Contra: Green v. Green, 21o N.C. i47, 185 S.E. 651 (1936), noted in 15 N. Car. L. Rev.
67 (i936); see Campbell v. Campbell, 200 S.C. 67, 20 S.E. 2d 237 (1942).
20 See Ethridge,

(1919).

J. dissenting, Rawlings v. Rawlings,

121 Miss. 140, 155, 83 So. 146, 148
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of collusion or where it is a case of a recalcitrant child questioning parental
authority. Where these situations do not exist there appears no sound reason
for continuing to deny to the one person who has really been injured the right
to seek legal redress. 2'
A California statute provides that a person must support to the best of his
ability a child or parent who is unable to support himself.22 The statute is simply
a legislative declaration of the duty; it neither provides a sanction nor stipulates who may enforce this duty. The statute, however, has been construed to
permit the neglected or abandoned party to enforce the duty of support by a
bill in equity.23 The remedy provided in California should be available in any
2 4
jurisdiction where it is recognized that the parent is under a duty of support.
The2 Supreme Court of Georgia in Pavesick v. New England Mutual Life Ins.
Co. S found that a cause of action exists for the invasion-of the right of privacy
by drawing upon the fairly general state constitutional provision which provides that for every injury there shall be a remedy. Even in the absence of a
statutory declaration of the parental duty of support, the technique employed
in the Pavesich case, would be available to afford a remedy wherever that duty
is recognized.
If the duty of parent to child is recognized, the inducing the breach of that
duty should be actionable. Lumley v. Gye 6 held that a third person is liable to
the promisee for inducing the promisor to breach his contract. The fact that the
defendant in the principal case induced the breach of a duty founded on status
rather than contractual relationship should not make the analogy inappropriate. Lumley v. Gye involved the inducement of the breach of a contract for
2r However, in a suit for damages by a daughter against her father, who had been convicted
of raping her, her action was defeated by the public policy argument that the repose of society
would be upset if a child could sue her parent! Roller v. Roller, 7 Wash. 242, 79 Pac" 788 (19o5).
See McCurdy, Torts between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1030, io59-8r

(1930).
- Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 194) § 206.
23

Paxton v. Paxton, x~o Cal. 667, 89 Pac. 1083 (1907).

the workmen's compensation law it has been held that if an employee is killed in
the course of employment the employer is liable to the minor children; unless the employer
can show that a child has been emancipated the parent is under a legal duty to support the
child. Auburn and Alton Coal Co. v. Industrial Com'n, 296 Ill. 568, 13o N.E. 322 (1921).
A statute which imposed criminal sanctions for failure to install certain railway safety devices
has been held to impose civil liability on a company which failed to install the devices. Speaking
of the statute the court said, "The expression of one mode of enforcing it did not exclude the
operation of another, and in many respects more efficacious, means of compelling compliance
with its terms, to wit, the right of civil action .... by one of the class sought to be protected
by the statute....." Narramore v. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. R. Co., 96 Fed. 298,300 (C.C.A.
6th, 1899). The same technique should be available for imposition of civil liability under
statutes which impose criminal sanctions on a parent for failing to support his child. See note
17, supra.
122 Ga. i9o, 5o S.E. 68 (19o5).
262 E. and B. 216 (1853).
24Under

2S
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personal service and was founded on the tort of enticing a servant from his
master.2 7 The peculiar duties involved in the master-servant relationship arise
from the status of the relationship rather than the contract which created it.
Even more applicable is the broad principle enunciated in Wilkinson v. Downton 5 that unjustifiable wilful conduct which results in harm to the plaintiff is
actionable. The ease with which the Lumley v. Gye doctrine has been extended
can only be explained by the recognition of this principle.29 Similarly this doctrine was evidenced in Bohannon v. Wachovia Bank and Trust Co.30 in which it
was held that the malicious misconduct of the defendant in inducing a testator
to alter his will made him liable to the plaintiff for the loss of his expectancy.
Thus the Luniley v. Gye doctrine, coupled with the principle that wilful misconduct is actionable, should be a sufficient basis for the imposition of liability
on the defendant in the instant case. The policy arguments advanced to deny
the child the right to sue the parent should not be applicable where the suit is
brought against the enticer.
Precedent is certainly not available for such a suit.3' Owing to the influence

of the Roman law and the old common law concepts of the superiority of the
father as lord and master of his household, much of the present day law of
domestic relations is anachronistic. A frank recognition that we have developed
our own concepts regarding the family unit is necessary in order to shake off the
vestigial remains of the Roman law. 32 Today each member of the family unit
has individual rights and duties. Any doctrine which denies an injured member
of the unit legal redress for injuries committed either by members of his family
or by outsiders is indeed shocking to the repose of twentieth-century society.
27Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 Harv. L. Rev. 663, 668 (1923).
2s

[i897] 2 Q.B. 57.

29 Whether the Lumley v. Gye doctrine was applicable to other than personal service contracts was not known until Temperton v. Russell (i893) i Q.B. 75, which was decided only
four years before Wilkinson v. Downton.
30 21o N.C. 679, 188 S.E. 390 (1936), noted in 4 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 5o9 (1937).

3'In the case of Morrow v. Yannantuono, 252 Misc. 134, 273 N.Y. Supp. 912 (2934), noted
in 20 Corn. L.Q. 255 (2935), an infant was denied recovery from the enticer of his mother.
This case is distinguishable in that no loss of support was involved. The court denied recovery
because the plaintiff could not show a loss of consortium, and further it was noted that the
plaintiff's father could bring an alienation-of-affections action.
32 At Roman law the family consisting of the parents, children, and slaves was regarded as
unit headed by the father known as the paterfamilias. It was the paterfamiliaswho sought

legal redress for all injuries to any member of the unit. And even after certain members were
permitted to bring actions in their own name, the paterfamiliasnever lost his right to bring
his indirect actions for such injuries. The similarity of the indirect action of the paterfamilias
and the action for loss of services by the husband, master, or father is apparent. Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 Harv. L. Rev. 663 (1923).

